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Abstract. In recent years, there has been a great effort to prove the security of
quantum key distribution (QKD) with a minimum number of assumptions. Besides
its intrinsic theoretical interest, this would allow for larger tolerance against device
imperfections in the actual implementations. However, even in this device-independent
scenario, one assumption seems unavoidable, that is, the presence of a protected
space devoid of any unwanted information leakage in which the legitimate parties can
privately generate, process and store their classical data. In this paper we relax this
unrealistic and hardly feasible assumption and introduce a general formalism to tackle
the information leakage problem in most of existing QKD systems. More specifically,
we prove the security of optical QKD systems using phase and intensity modulators
in their transmitters, which leak the setting information in an arbitrary manner. We
apply our security proof to cases of practical interest and show key rates similar to those
obtained in a perfectly shielded environment. Our work constitutes a fundamental step
forward in guaranteeing implementation security of quantum communication systems.
1. Introduction
It is well-known that two spatially separated users (Alice and Bob) can secretly
communicate over a public channel if they own two identical random keys unknown
to any third party. They can use their keys to enable symmetric-key encryption.
When the symmetric-key algorithm is the so-called “one-time pad” [1], the security
of the resulting communication is independent of the computational capability of an
eavesdropper (Eve) [2]. The only provably secure way known to date to distill secret
random keys at remote locations is quantum key distribution (QKD) [3, 4, 5, 6]. While
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the theoretical security of QKD has been convincingly proven in recent years [5], in
practice a QKD realisation cannot typically perfectly satisfy the requirements imposed
by the theory. Therefore it is crucial that security proofs are extended to accommodate
the imperfections of the real QKD devices. Any unaccounted imperfection constitutes
a so-called “side-channel”, which can be exploited by Eve to compromise the security
of the system [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17].
To close the gap between theory and practice, various approaches have been
proposed so far, with two most prominent examples being “device-independent
QKD” [18, 19, 20, 21] and decoy-state “measurement-device-independent QKD”
(mdiQKD) [22]. Device-independent QKD does not require a complete knowledge of how
QKD apparatuses operate, being its security based on the violation of a Bell inequality.
However, its experimental complexity is unsuitable for practical applications, as its
ultimate form demands that Alice and Bob perform a loophole-free Bell test [23, 24, 25]
in every QKD session. Also, its secret key rate is very poor with current technology [26,
27]. Decoy-state mdiQKD, on the other hand, permits to remove any assumption of
trustfulness from the measurement device, which is arguably the weakest part of QKD
realisations [7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14]. Under the only additional requirement that Alice
and Bob know their state preparation process [28], mdiQKD with decoy-states allows
to bring QKD theory closer to practice [29] without frustrating the key rate [22, 30].
Most importantly, its practical feasibility has been already experimentally demonstrated
both in laboratories and in field trials [31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38], with a key rate
comparable to that of standard QKD protocols [37].
However, it is important to notice that the security of any form of QKD, including
the two solutions above, relies on the assumption that Alice and Bob’s devices do not
leak any unwanted information to the outside. That is, their apparatuses must be
inside private spaces that are well-shielded and inaccessible to Eve (see, e.g., [39]). This
assumption is very hard, if not impossible, to guarantee in practice. The behaviour
of real devices is affected by the environmental conditions and can depend on their
response to external signals, unawarely triggered by a legitimate user, or maliciously
injected into the QKD system by Eve. This could open new side-channels, of which
the so-called Trojan-Horse attack (THA) [40, 41, 42] is a meaningful example. While
mdiQKD relieves QKD from the burden of characterising the measuring devices, the
THA deals with the important question of guaranteeing a protected boundary between
the transmitting devices, assigned with the preparation of the initial quantum states,
and the outside world.
In a THA, Eve injects bright light pulses into the users’ devices and analyse
the back-reflected light, with the aim of extracting more information from the signals
travelling in the quantum channel. Recently, [42] considered a feasible THA targeting
the phase modulator (PM) of a QKD transmitter. There, security was proven under
the assumption that this specific THA only affects the PM in the transmitter and
leaves the other devices untouched. Therefore this result cannot be exported to decoy-
state QKD and mdiQKD, where an additional method to modulate the intensity of the
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prepared signals is required. This is very often achieved via an intensity modulator
(IM) inserted in series with the PM. Hence it can happen that partial information
about the IM is leaked to Eve, similarly to what happens for the PM. This problem is
common to any scheme using devices like PM and IM, such as the decoy-state BB84
protocol [43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51], bit commitment, oblivious transfer, secure
identification [52], blind quantum computing [53] as well as device-independent QKD.
Here we introduce a general formalism to prove the security of most of the optical
QKD systems using a PM and an IM in their transmitters that can leak the setting
information in an arbitrary manner. As a specific example, we address the optical
implementation of the standard decoy-state BB84 QKD protocol with three intensity
settings [43, 44, 45] due to its extensive use of devices like PM and IM. However,
our results can be straightforwardly adapted to any number of settings and to all the
protocols mentioned above. Importantly, our approach is solely based on how the users’
devices operate. For a given model of PM and IM, one could readily use our technique
to calculate the resulting secret key rate of the system. This constitutes a fundamental
step forward to guaranteeing the security of quantum cryptographic schemes using a
PM, an IM or other analogous devices, in presence of information leakage.
To illustrate how our formalism applies to real QKD systems, we investigate
a particular form of information leakage, i.e., a THA that is feasible with current
technology. In particular, we consider that Eve injects a probe for each phase and
intensity setting selected by the legitimate user and the back-reflected light is composed
of coherent states of limited intensity.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sec. 2 we review the main concepts of decoy-
state QKD. In Sec. 3 we present a general formalism to prove its security in the presence
of any information leakage from both the PM and the IM. This formalism is then used
in Sec. 4 to study various THA that are feasible with current technology and to evaluate
their effect on the system performance. Finally, Sec. 5 includes a short discussion and
Sec. 6 concludes the paper with a summary. The paper also contains Appendixes with
calculations that are needed to derive the results in the main text.
2. Decoy-state quantum key distribution
In decoy-state QKD, Alice prepares mixtures of Fock states with different photon
number statistics, selected independently at random for every signal that is sent to
Bob. These states can be prepared with practical light sources such as attenuated laser
diodes, heralded spontaneous parametric downconversion sources and other practical
single-photon sources. They can be formally described as:
ργ =
∞∑
n=0
pγn|n〉〈n|. (1)
Here, pγn is the photon number statistics, represented by the conditional probability that
Alice emits a pulse with n photons when she chooses the intensity setting γ. The ket
Decoy-state quantum key distribution with a leaky source 4
|n〉 denotes an n-photon Fock state. If Alice uses a source emitting phase-randomised
weak coherent pulses (WCP), the photon number statistics is the Poisson distribution,
pγn = e
−γγn/n!, with γ being the mean photon number.
For each intensity setting γ, there are two quantities which can be directly observed
in the experiment: the gain Qγ = Nγclick/N
γ, where Nγclick represents the number of
events where Bob observes a click in his measurement device given that Alice prepared
the state ργ, and Nγ is the number of signals sent by Alice in the state ργ, and the
quantum bit error rate (QBER) Eγ = Nγerror/N
γ
click, where N
γ
error denotes the number of
errors observed by Bob given that Alice prepared the state ργ. In the asymptotic limit
of large Nγ both quantities can be written as a function of the yield Yn and the error
rate en of the n-photon signals as:
Qγ =
∞∑
n=0
pγnYn,
Eγ =
1
Qγ
∞∑
n=0
pγnYnen, (2)
for any value of γ. The unknown parameters in this set of linear equations are Yn and
en, and they can be estimated by solving Eq. (2).
Indeed, whenever Alice uses an infinite number of settings γ, any finite set of
parameters Yn and en can be estimated with arbitrary precision. If Alice and Bob are
only interested in the value of Y0, Y1, and e1, as is the case in QKD, it is possible to
obtain a tight estimation of these three parameters with only a few different intensity
settings [54]. A fundamental implicit requirement in the decoy-state analysis is that
the variables Yn and en are independent of the intensity setting γ. That is, the analysis
assumes that Eve does not have any information about Alice’s intensity setting choice at
each given time. If Eve performs a THA against Alice’s source, however, this necessary
condition might not be longer satisfied and the security analysis of decoy-state QKD
needs to be revised. This is done in the next section.
3. Trojan horse attacks against decoy-state quantum key distribution
In this section we present a general formalism to evaluate the security of decoy-state
QKD against any information leakage from both the IM, which is used to generate
decoy-states, and the PM employed to encode the bit and the basis information. Below
we assume that such information leakage is due to an active Eve who launches a THA
against the decoy-state transmitter. Note, however, that our analysis could be applied
as well to any passive information leakage scenario.
In a THA Eve injects bright light pulses into Alice’s device and measures the back-
reflected light. This way she might obtain useful information about Alice’s intensity
and phase choices for each generated signal. This situation is illustrated in Fig. 1. As a
first consequence, the yields Yn and the error rates en might now become dependent on
the intensity setting γ, and we will denote them as Y γn and e
γ
n, respectively. The goal of
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this section is mainly to evaluate how much can these quantities differ from each other
depending on the information leaked to Eve.
Figure 1. The users Alice and Bob run a QKD protocol with apparatuses that can
have leakages (thin arrow in the figure). Any such leaked signal could be captured
by Eve and used to steal private information. Eve can even actively shine high-power
electromagnetic fields on the system (thick arrow in the figure) to trigger the emission
of side-channel signals.
3.1. THA against the IM
Here we focus on the most widely used choice of intensity settings for the standard
decoy-state BB84 protocol, where Alice randomly selects one of three possible intensities,
denoted as γs, γv, and γw, with probability ps, pv, and pw, respectively. However, our
technique can be straightforwardly adapted to cover any number of decoy settings. We
will denote as γi ∈ {γs, γv, γw} the intensity setting selected by Alice in the ith instance
of the protocol.
Eve’s goal is to learn the value of γi for all instances i. For this, her most general
THA can be described as follows. Eve first prepares a probe system Ep, which might be
entangled with an ancilla system E also in Eve’s hands, and sends this system to Alice
while she keeps E in a quantum memory. The system Ep may consist of many different
pulses, each of them used to probe Alice’s intensity setting each given time. Afterwards,
Eve performs a joint measurement on all the pulses emitted by Alice together with the
systems E and the back-reflected light from Ep, which is denoted as E
′
p.
Let us consider first the ith n-photon pulse emitted by Alice. Later on we will
generalise this case to cover all her n-photon pulses. For this, let ρn,γi denote the joint
state of Alice’s ith n-photon pulse and the systems E and E′p ‡. The state of E′p may
depend on all the intensity choices made by Alice, so does ρn,γi . Now, Eve’s task for
the ith pulse is to behave as different as possible according to Alice’s intensity choice
γi given the state ρn,γi . Therefore, we are interested in how well can Eve distinguish
‡ For example, if the emission of an n-photon pulse by Alice is independent of Eve’s systems E and E′p,
then ρn,γi = Pˆ (|n〉)⊗ ργi , where the operator Pˆ (|φ〉) is defined as Pˆ (|φ〉) := |φ〉〈φ| and ργi represents
the state of E and E′p. This is the typical situation that one expects in practice.
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the intensity setting γij from γ
i
k and γ
i
l , with j, k, l ∈ {s,v,w} and j 6= k, l (note that
here k might be equal to l). This can be solved using the trace distance argument [55],
which says that the trace distance between probability distributions arising from any
measurement on the states ρn,γij and qnklρn,γik + (1− qnkl)ρn,γil := σn,γikl satisfies∑
ω∈Ω
|Pr(ω|ρn,γij)− Pr(ω|σn,γikl)| ≤ 2d
(
ρn,γij , σn,γikl
)
, (3)
where Ω is a set of physical events that fulfills
∑
ω∈Ω Pr(ω) = 1, d(ρ, σ) := Tr |ρ− σ| /2
denotes the trace distance between ρ and σ, Pr(ω|ρ) is the conditional probability to
obtain the event ω given the state ρ, and qnkl := pkp
γk
n /(pkp
γk
n +plp
γl
n ), with k, l ∈ {s,v,w},
is the conditional probability to have selected the intensity setting γk (among only γk
and γl) given that the pulse contains n photons §.
To prove the security of the decoy-state QKD system, we need to determine Bob’s
detection rates. This means that we are interested in the set Ω = {click, no click},
where “click” (“no click”) represents a detection (no detection) outcome at Bob’s side.
That is, Eve must decide which of Alice’s pulses will produce (or not produce) a “click”
at Bob’s side before the quantum part of the protocol finishes. Here, Pr(click|ρn,γij) is
the conditional probability that Bob obtains a “click” given ρn,γij . This probability may
depend on the detection pattern observed by Bob in all the previous i − 1 pulses. By
combining Eq. (3) with the fact that Pr(click) + Pr(no click) = 1 we find that
|Pr(click|ρn,γij)− Pr(click|σn,γikl)| ≤ d
(
ρn,γij , σn,γikl
)
:= Din,j,k,l. (4)
Now, in order to relate the conditional probabilities that appear in Eq. (4) with the
corresponding actual numbers, we first convert these probabilities into joint probabilities
and then we take the sum over i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N}, being N the number of trials. In
particular, let Pr(click, n, γij) denote the joint probability that Eve observes the state
ρn,γij in the instance i and Bob obtains a “click”. Then, from Eq. (4) we obtain that∣∣∣∣ N∑
i=1
Pr(click, n, γij)− pjpγjn
N∑
i=1
[
qnkl
Pr(click, n, γik)
pkp
γk
n
+ (1− qnkl)
× Pr(click, n, γ
i
l )
plp
γl
n
]∣∣∣∣ ≤ pjpγjn NDn,j,k,l , (5)
where Dn,j,k,l := 1/N
∑N
i=1 D
i
n,j,k,l. Importantly, by using Azuma’s inequality [56] (see
Appendix A), each term on the LHS of Eq.(5) approaches the actual numbers of the
corresponding events except for a probability exponentially small in N . That is, we
have that
∑N
i=1 Pr(click, n, γ
i
j) approaches the number of events, Nclick,n,γj , within N
runs where Alice selects the intensity setting j, she emits an n-photon state, and Bob
obtains a “click” in his measurement device. This means that
|Y γjn − [qnklY γkn + (1− qnkl)Y γln ]| ≤ Dn,j,k,l , (6)
§ Note that when k = l Eq. (3) implies that ∑ω∈Ω |Pr(ω|ρn,γij )−Pr(ω|ρn,γik)| ≤ 2d(ρn,γij , ρn,γik) for all
j, k ∈ {s,v,w}.
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except for a probability exponentially small in N ‖, where the yields Y γjn are defined as
Y γjn :=
Nclick,n,γj
Npjp
γj
n
, (7)
and similarly for Y γkn and Y
γl
n . Note that in the special case where there is no information
leakage about Alice’s intensity choices, we have that Dn,j,k,l = 0 and, therefore,
Y
γj
n = Y γkn = Y
γl
n := Yn, which is the key assumption in the standard decoy-state
method (see Sec. 2).
The analysis for the error rates e
γj
n , with j ∈ {s, v,w}, is analogous. In particular,
here we consider the set Ω = {click∧ error, no click∨ (click∧ no error)}, where “click ∧
error” represents a detection outcome at Bob’s side associated with an error, and “no
click ∨ (click ∧ no error)” denotes a no detection outcome or a detection one associated
with no error. Now, taking into account that Pr(click ∧ error) + Pr[no click ∨ (click ∧
no error)] = 1, and using a similar analysis as above, we find that
|Y γjn eγjn − [qnklY γkn eγkn + (1− qnkl)Y γln eγln ]| ≤ Dn,j,k,l , (8)
where the parameter Dn,j,k,l is equal to that given in Eq. (6) ¶, and eγjn is defined as
eγjn :=
Nclick∧error,n,γj
Nclick,n,γj
, (9)
and similarly for eγkn and e
γl
n . Here, Nclick∧error,n,γj represents the number of events, within
N runs, where Alice selects the intensity setting j, she emits an n-photon state, and
Bob obtains a “click” associated to an error in his measurement device.
The formalism above is general in the sense that it can be applied to any THA
against Alice’s IM. However, to be able to evaluate Eqs. (6)-(8) one needs to characterise
the states ρn,γij that are accessible to Eve, and this might be difficult in general. These
states are required to calculate the coefficients Din,j,k,l and, thus, the parameters Dn,j,k,l.
In the next subsection we show that these parameters can in principle be estimated
based solely on the behaviour of the IM.
3.1.1. Estimation of Din,j,k,l. In order to upper bound the value of D
i
n,j,k,l based only
on how the IM operates, we consider the unitary operator that describes the action of
Alice’s IM when she selects a certain intensity setting γij for an instance i. Importantly,
we assume that this operator characterises the behaviour of the IM on all the optical
modes that it supports. That is, in general it acts on Alice’s photonic system Ap (i.e.,
the signal states emitted by her laser), on some additional ancillary system Aa also in
Alice’s hands+, and on Eve’s probe system Ep. Therefore, we will denote it as Uˆ
γij
Ap,Aa,Ep
.
‖ Note that when k = l Eq. (6) implies that |Y γjn − Y γkn | ≤ Dn,j,k with Dn,j,k := 1/N
∑N
i=1D
i
n,j,k and
Din,j,k = d(ρn,γij , ρn,γik).
¶ If k = l then Eq. (8) implies that |Y γjn eγjn − Y γkn eγkn | ≤ Dn,j,k.
+ The system Aa can account for the effect of the loss in Alice’s transmitter. That is, we consider that
the unitary operator describing her IM includes as well, together with its intrinsic loss, the effect of
any optical attenuator, isolator and filter used by Alice to reduce the energy of the back-reflected light
that goes to Eve.
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Let |Ψ〉Ap,Aa,E,Ep be the joint state that describes Alice’s and Eve’s systems before
the action of the IM. After applying the IM, the state |Ψ〉Ap,Aa,E,Ep evolves according
to the unitary transformation 1ˆE ⊗ Uˆγ
i
j
Ap,Aa,Ep
. Importantly, in order for the decoy-state
method to work, this unitary transformation should produce an output signal with the
system A′p (which will be sent to Bob through the quantum channel once the bit and
basis information are also encoded) prepared in a state that is diagonal in the Fock
basis. This is guaranteed if Eve’s probing light does not alter the photon distribution
of Alice’s light source or her phase-randomisation process. Note here that the physical
system corresponding to A′p might not be the same as the one for the input system Ap.
This means, in particular, that
1ˆE ⊗ Uˆγ
i
j
Ap,Aa,Ep
|Ψ〉Ap,Aa,E,Ep =
∑
n
√
p
γij
n |nγij〉A′p |φ
γij
n,Ψ〉A′a,E,E′p , (10)
Here, p
γij
n denotes the probability of emitting an n-photon pulse in the ith instance
of setting γj, and {|φγ
i
j
n,Ψ〉A′a,E,E′p}n forms an orthonormal basis, i.e., we have that
A′a,E,E′p〈φ
γij
n′,Ψ|φ
γij
n,Ψ〉A′a,E,E′p = δn′n. Moreover, the physical systems for A
′
a and E
′
p might
be different from those for Aa and Ep, respectively. Also, note that in Eq. (10) we have
made the general assumption that the photon mode of the n-photon state |nγij〉A′p might
be dependent on the setting γij.
Now, we focus on those joint states |nγij〉Ap |φ
γij
n,Ψ〉A′a,E,E′p that contain n photons on
Alice’s photonic system A′p. Eve’s task is to behave as differently as possible according
to the intensity setting. We find, therefore, that Din,j,k,l can be upper bounded as
Din,j,k,l ≤ Sup|Ψ〉
Ap,Aa,E,Ep
d
(
TrA′a
[
Pˆ (|nγij〉A′p|φ
γij
n,Ψ〉A′a,E,E′p)
]
,
TrA′a
[
qnklPˆ (|nγik〉A′p |φ
γik
n,Ψ〉A′a,E,E′p)
+ (1− qnkl)Pˆ (|nγil 〉A′p |φ
γil
n,Ψ〉A′a,E,E′p)
])
, (11)
where the operator Pˆ (|φ〉) := |φ〉〈φ|. This confirms that the description of Alice’s IM is
enough to guarantee security.
Of course, the formalism above can readily accept any particular assumption on the
THA performed by Eve. For instance, in practical situations it may be over-pessimistic
to take the supremum given in Eq. (11) over all possible states |Ψ〉Ap,Aa,E,Ep . Instead,
one might only consider signals of the form |Ψ〉Ap,Aa,E,Ep = |φ〉Ap |ϕ〉Aa|χ〉E,Ep , where
|φ〉Ap , |ϕ〉Aa and |χ〉E,Ep are pure states of the different systems. Indeed, this seems to
be a natural assumption because Alice’s systems Ap and Aa are typically independent
from each other and also independent from those of Eve. In so doing, Eq. (11) might
deliver tighter bounds for Din,j,k,l.
In general, however, one cannot assume that Eve’s state |χ〉E,Ep is in a tensor
product form. That is, it is not enough to just consider the system Ep that Eve sends
to Alice (together with the back-reflected one) in order to guarantee security. This is
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so because when the supremum given in Eq. (11) is taken over all joint states |χ〉E,Ep
it usually results in a larger trace distance than that obtained when one considers
product states. To improve the system performance, Alice might include additional
optical elements to force |χ〉E,Ep to be of product form. For example, she could perform
a phase-randomisation on the system Ep (see, e.g., [58, 59]). This way all the off-
diagonal elements of the state |χ〉E,Ep in the Fock basis would vanish, and one could
completely disregard system E. Moreover, mathematically, to remove all the off-diagonal
elements leads to a significant decrease of the trace distance and, therefore, one expects
a significant improvement of the secure key rate, as is confirmed in Sec. 4.3.
3.2. THA against the PM
In this section, we review and extend the analysis of the THA against the PM carried out
in [42]. The central observation is that the THA allows Eve to partially know Alice’s
choice of the basis. In other terms, the information leakage is in the form of basis
information leaked out to the eavesdropper. This might cause the density matrices that
describe Alice’s output states to be basis dependent. Below, we provide a formalism to
prove the security of the BB84 protocol in the presence of the most general THA against
the PM.
We will assume that Alice’s choice is random, independent of the IM and of
the previous preparation instances. We define the Z basis by the orthogonal vectors
{|0〉, |1〉} and the X basis by {|+〉, |−〉}, where |±〉 := (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2. We denote as
|ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p (|ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p) the joint state that describes Alice’s system and Eve’s
system for the THA given that Alice selected the Z (X) basis. Here, the superscript i
refers to the ith signal generated by Alice, and the system Aq refers to a virtual qubit
that is stored in Alice’s lab. Examples of the states |ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p and |ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p
are the following
|ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p =
1√
2
(
|0〉Aq |Ψi0Z〉Ap,Aa,E,E′p + |1〉Aq |Ψ
i
1Z
〉
Ap,Aa,E,E′p
)
, (12)
|ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p =
1√
2
(
|+〉Aq |Ψi0X〉Ap,Aa,E,E′p + |−〉Aq |Ψ
i
1X
〉
Ap,Aa,E,E′p
)
.(13)
Here, |Ψijα〉Ap,Aa,E,E′p (with j ∈ {0, 1} and α ∈ {Z,X}) represents the state of systems
Ap,Aa,E and E
′
p for Alice’s bit value j in her α basis. We have, therefore, that
Alice’s state preparation process can be equivalently described as follows. First, she
decides which state (|ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p or |ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p) she prepares. Afterwards, she
measures the virtual qubit Aq using the Z or the X basis, depending on the choice of
the state. As long as the state preparation is expressed this way, one can consider any
possible purification of the states |ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p or |ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p . For instance, one
may consider |ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p = e
iν√
2
(
|−〉Aq |Ψi0X〉Ap,Aa,E,E′p + |+〉Aq |Ψ
i
1X
〉
Ap,Aa,E,E′p
)
with
ν ∈ [0, 2pi) being a global phase. Note that we can consider this state because the
reduced density operator for systems Ap,Aa,E and E
′
p is the same as that of Eq. (13).
The optimal solution is the purification that maximises the key generation rate.
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In a security proof, it is essential to determine the phase error rate, which is
the parameter needed in the privacy amplification step of the protocol. The phase
error rate is the fictitious bit error rate that Alice and Bob would have obtained if
Alice had measured the system Aq with the X basis and Bob had used the X basis
given the preparation of |ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p . Intuitively, if the states |ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p and
|ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p are close enough to each other, then the phase error rate should be
close to the X basis error rate which is obtained in the actual experiment. Below, we
make this argument more rigorous by using the analysis presented in [61]. For this, we
will assume that the basis choice is done in a coherent manner, i.e., Alice first prepares
the joint system
|Ψi〉Ac,Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p =
1√
2
(
|0〉Ac |ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p + |1〉Ac |ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p
)
,
(14)
where the system Ac is the so-called “quantum coin” [60]. Importantly, the phase
error rate is related to the X basis measurement on the quantum coin. To derive the
formula for the estimation of the phase error rate, we consider the following fictitious
protocol. In particular, for the ith trial of the protocol, Alice and Eve prepare their
systems in the state |Ψi〉Ac,Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p , Alice keeps systems Aa, Aq and Ac in her hands,
and sends system Ap to Bob. At the reception side, Bob receives some optical systems
after Eve’s intervention, and he performs the X basis measurement. In addition, Alice
performs the X basis measurement on the system Aq. Then, Alice randomly chooses
between the Z or the X basis with equal probability to measure her quantum coin Ac.
Here, note that, from Eq. (14), when Alice chooses the Z basis to measure the coin
and the result is “0” (“1”), this is equivalent to Alice and Eve directly preparing the
state |ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p (|ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p). Next, we apply the Bloch sphere bound [62]
for probability distributions to those instances where Bob obtained a click event. In
particular, we first apply this bound separately to the events with the X basis error and
to those with no X basis error. We obtain the following two inequalities
1− 2Pri(XAc = −|X− Error)
≤ 2
√
Pri(ZAc = 1|X− Error)(1− Pri(ZAc = 1|X− Error)), (15)
1− 2Pri(XAc = −|No X− Error)
≤ 2
√
Pri(ZAc = 1|No X− Error)(1− Pri(ZAc = 1|No X− Error)) .
(16)
Here, Pri(XAc = −|X − Error) is the conditional probability of observing the outcome
“−” when performing the X basis measurement on the quantum coin given that there
is a X basis error; Pri(ZAc = 1|X − Error) is the conditional probability of observing
the outcome “1” when performing the Z basis measurement on the quantum coin given
that there is a X basis error; and the other probabilities are defined similarly. Next,
we multiply both inequalities by the term Pri(click), which is the probability that Bob
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obtains a “click” in his measurement apparatus, and after combining Eqs. (15)-(16) we
obtain [61]
Pri(click)− 2Pri(XAc = −) ≤ 2
√
Pri(X,X− Error)Pri(Z,X− Error)
+2
√
Pri(X,No X− Error)Pri(Z,No X− Error), (17)
where Pri(XAc = −) is the probability that the measurement result on the quantum
coin is “−”, Pri(X,X − Error) is the joint probability of selecting the Z basis to
measure the quantum coin and obtaining the result “1” (which implies the preparation
of the state |ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p), and observing a bit error in Alice’s and Bob’s X basis
measurement. The probability Pri(Z,X − Error) is the fictitious joint probability of
selecting the Z basis to measure the quantum coin, and obtaining the result “0” (which
implies the preparation of the state |ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p), and observing a bit error in
Alice’s and Bob’s X basis measurement. Actually, this last probability is the phase
error rate. The probabilities Pri(X,No X−Error) and Pri(Z,No X−Error) are defined
in a similar way (see [61] for further details). Note that in order to obtain Eq. (17)
from Eqs. (15)-(16) we have used the fact that Pri(XAc = −, click) ≤ Pri(XAc = −),
where Pri(XAc = −, click) represents the joint probability that the measurement result
on the quantum coin is “−” and Bob obtains a “click” event with his measurement.
Importantly, the probability Pri(XAc = −) characterises how close are the states
|ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p and |ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p . Specifically, by choosing an appropriate global
phase for |ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p , from Eq. (14) we have that
Pri(XAc = −) =
1
2
(
1− ∣∣Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p〈ΨiZ|ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p∣∣) . (18)
The term |Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p〈ΨiZ|ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p| can be upper-bounded by the fidelity
between the Z basis state and the X basis state. This means that Eq. (17) gives us the
phase error probability taking into account the “closeness” between the two basis states.
To relate the probabilities with the actual number of the corresponding events, we first
use the concavity of the square root function and we take the sum over i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N},
with N being the number of pulses sent in the fictitious protocol. In so doing, we find
that
N∑
i=1
Pri(click)− 2
N∑
i=1
Pri(XAc = −)
≤ 2
√√√√[ N∑
i=1
Pri(X,X− Error)
][
N∑
i=1
Pri(Z,X− Error)
]
+ 2
√√√√[ N∑
i=1
Pri(X,No X− Error)
][
N∑
i=1
Pri(Z,No X− Error)
]
. (19)
Next, we apply Azuma’s inequality [56] (see Appendix A). We obtain, therefore,
that except for a probability exponentially small in N each sum of the probability
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distributions approaches the actual number of the corresponding events in N trials.
That is,
1− 2NXAc=−
Nclick
≤ 2
√
NX,X−Error
Nclick
NZ,X−Error
Nclick
+ 2
√
NX,No X−Error
Nclick
NZ,No X−Error
Nclick
, (20)
where Ng denotes the number of instances associated to the event g. Importantly, here
NZ,X−Error/Nclick is related to the phase error rate, that is, the rate of choosing the Z
basis and having the phase error, and NX,X−Error/Nclick is the observed ratio of choosing
the X basis and having a bit error. As for NXAc=−, we have that except for a probability
exponentially small in N the following inequality is satisfied.
NXAc=− ≤
N∑
i=1
1− |Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p〈ΨiZ|ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p |
2
≤ N
2
[
1−min
i
|Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p〈ΨiZ|ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p |
]
. (21)
This is so because we can directly calculate the probability Pri(XAc = −) from Eq.
(14). Therefore, if Alice and Bob know the minimum overlap between the states
|ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p and |ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p they can estimate the value of the phase error
rate even if Eve performs the most general THA against the PM. The estimation of
such overlap, however, might be difficult in general as one would need to know Eve’s
ancilla state. To overcome this problem, we proceed like in the previous section and we
reformulate the formalism above based only on how the PM operates.
For this, note that |ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p and |ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p can be expressed as
|Ψiζ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p := 1ˆAq,E ⊗ Uˆ
ζ,i
Ap,Aa,Ep
|Ψ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,Ep , (22)
where ζ ∈ {X,Z}, and Uˆ ζ,iAp,Aa,Ep∗ is the ith unitary transformation associated to the
PM. It supports Alice’s photonic system Ap and her ancilla Aa, and Eve’s ancilla E
together with her probe system Ep. With this unitary transformation, the overlap
between |ΨiZ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p and |ΨiX〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,E′p for the ith instance can be lower-bounded
as
Inf|Ψ〉
Aq,Ap,AaE,Ep
∣∣∣Aq,Ap,Aa,E,Ep〈Ψ|UˆZ,i†Ap,Aa,EpUˆX,iAp,Aa,Ep|Ψ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,Ep∣∣∣ , (23)
which is independent of the state. Note that here we have used the infimum because
the unitary operator could support a mode in a Hilbert space containing an arbitrary
number of photons. Therefore, Eq. (20) can be written as
1− N
Nclick
(
1−min
i
Inf|Ψ〉
Aq,Ap,AaE,Ep
∣∣∣∣Aq,Ap,Aa,E,Ep〈Ψ|UˆZ,i†Ap,Aa,EpUˆX,iAp,Aa,Ep
∗ Similar to the IM, in general, the PM and other devices, may be correlated in their operations. In
this case, this unitary transformation could depend on all the previous intensity choices that Alice has
already made.
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× |Ψ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,Ep
∣∣∣∣) ≤ 2√NX,X−ErrorNclick NZ,X−ErrorNclick
+ 2
√
NX,No X−Error
Nclick
NZ,No X−Error
Nclick
. (24)
Finally, we use
δX−Error|X :=
NX,X−Error
NX
, δNo X−Error|X :=
NX,No X−Error
NX
,
δX−Error|Z :=
NZ,X−Error
NZ
, δNo X−Error|Z :=
NZ,No X−Error
NZ
, (25)
where NZ (NX) is the number of events where Alice’s Z-basis measurement outcome on
the quantum coin is “0” (“1”). That is, Alice prepares the Z-basis (X-basis) state and
Bob detects signals in the Z basis (X basis) in the actual protocol (recall that the virtual
protocol concentrates only on the basis matched events). Then, by taking into account
that
√
x(1− x) ≤ 1/2 for 0 ≤ x ≤ 1, we obtain the following modified inequality
1− N
Nclick
(
1−min
i
Inf|Ψ〉
Aq,Ap,AaE,Ep
∣∣∣∣Aq,Ap,Aa,E,Ep〈Ψ|UˆZ,i†Ap,Aa,EpUˆX,iAp,Aa,Ep
|Ψ〉Aq,Ap,Aa,E,Ep
∣∣∣∣) ≤
√
NXδX−Error|X
Nclick
NZδX−Error|Z
Nclick
+
√
NX(1− δX−Error|X)
Nclick
NZ(1− δX−Error|Z)
Nclick
. (26)
Remember that Nclick represents the number of detected events by Bob in the actual
protocol since the quantum coins have been measured along the Z basis, which
corresponds to the case in the actual protocol. Therefore, we have that the RHS of
this equation is consistent with the results presented in [61].
Like in the previous section, note that the formalism above can readily accept any
assumption on the THA. For example, if one considers a specific THA against the PM
where Alice and Bob know the fidelity FX,Z between the two density matrices describing
the output states for the X and Z bases, we have that
1− N
Nclick
(1− FX,Z) ≤
√
NXδX−Error|X
Nclick
NZδX−Error|Z
Nclick
+
√
NX(1− δX−Error|X)
Nclick
NZ(1− δX−Error|Z)
Nclick
, (27)
which is essentially the result obtained in [42]. This means in particular that with the
estimation of the fidelity given for an explicit THA, as the one considered in the next
section, one can readily obtain the phase error rate and therefore the secure key rate of
a QKD system endowed with a leaky PM.
Until now we have discussed the scenario where the THA against the IM and the
PM acts independently on these two devices. However, in general, the IM and the
PM might present correlations which could be exploited by Eve in a joint THA. More
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specifically, the leaked information might be dependent on both the intensity setting
and the bit and basis choices. This situation is addressed in Appendix B, where we
discuss how to adapt the formalism above to also cover this case.
4. Simulation of the key generation rate
In order to apply the theoretical description to a practical case, we treat the THA as a
particular form of information leakage, actively caused by the eavesdropper. We draw
a realistic worst-case scenario following the line of Ref. [42], where a THA targeting the
PM placed in Alice’s box was studied. Here, we review this argument and employ it to
any other device that is actively modulated in the transmitting unit, in particular to the
IM that is commonly employed to run a decoy-state protocol. We assume that Eve uses
a continuous-wave (CW) high-power laser to probe a QKD transmitter. The suitability
of a CW laser for the THA is due to a twofold reason. Firstly, it is less destructive than a
pulsed laser [63], so it is less easily detectable by Alice and Bob. Secondly, a CW laser is
not less efficient than a pulsed laser in probing devices that are modulated according to
a non-return-to-zero (NRZ) logic, and assuming NRZ modulation for the transmitter’s
devices is a conservative choice [42]. Also, it is apparent that the THA is enhanced if
the power of Eve’s laser is as large as possible, because this maximises the amount of
back-reflected light for any fixed reflectivity of the transmitting unit. Therefore we can
think that Eve’s laser is operated well above threshold.
A consequence of these preliminary considerations is that it is not too restrictive in
practice to consider a THA performed with a CW laser operated well above threshold.
In turn, such a laser emits light in a state that is closely approximated by a single-
mode coherent state [64]. We will therefore assume in this section that Eve uses high-
intensity single-mode coherent states to perform the THA. Formally, we write the input
coherent state as |β′eiθ′〉, where β′ is a real number representing the amplitude of the
input light and θ′ is an arbitrary phase that can be set equal to zero without loss of
generality. Notice that even if Eve’s laser is CW, it still makes sense to use the expression
“light pulse” for Eve’s light, as a light pulse is temporally defined by Eve to match the
modulation period of the transmitter’s devices. When a coherent state of light enters
the QKD transmitter, it undergoes transformations that are linear and cannot change
its photon statistics. So the light back-reflected to Eve will still be in a coherent state,
which we indicate as:
|βγjeiθγj 〉. (28)
In this case, the real numbers βγj and θγj are amplitude and phase, respectively, of the
light back-reflected to Eve, which can depend on the intensity setting of the transmitter,
γj. Notice though that they are assumed not to depend on the particular instance i of
the preparation. Moreover, in writing Eq. (28), we assume that there is no entanglement
between Alice’s system Ap and Eve’s probe system E
′
p. Therefore we term “individual”
this particular class of THA.
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In the next sections, we will simulate the secure key rate of a typical decoy-state
QKD system against the individual THA, in three different cases of practical interest,
with the aim to provide security guidelines of immediate use in QKD experiments.
The three cases correspond to different assumptions about the state in Eq. (28), which
will be described in detail in the next Secs. 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3. These cases will be also
schematically summarised in Fig. 5, at the end of this section. However, Fig. 5 could
even be used as an introductory scheme to our models instead, as it conveniently displays
the assumptions underlying the simulations.
To draw the simulations, the main ingredient is the characterisation of the
transmitters’ modulators, which, as discussed in the previous section, leads to upper
bound the trace distance between the different settings of the modulators in the presence
of leaked information, as described by Eq. (11) (see also Appendix C and Appendix D).
In practice, this often translates into defining the modes transmitted by the modulators
and their attenuation coefficients. Then, a specific protocol can be considered and its
secure key rate estimated. In the simulations, we will consider the following lower bound
to the asymptotic secure key rate of the decoy-state BB84 protocol [3]:
K ≥ max
ΓA
min
ΓE
q{pγs0 Y γs0L + pγs1 Y γs1L [1− h(eγs1U)]− f(Eγs)Qγsh(Eγs)}, (29)
where ΓA and ΓE are the spaces of the parameters controlled by Alice and by Eve,
respectively. In the simulation, we will use ΓA = {γs, γv} and ΓE = {θγj}, and assume
without loss of generality that γs ≥ γv ≥ γw and θγs = 0, θγv ∈ [0, 2pi], θγw ∈ [θγv , 2pi].
Here, as for γw and βγj , we will fix them to particular constant values in the simulation.
In Eq. (29), the key is distilled only from the signal states; q is the efficiency of the
protocol; pγs0 = e
−γs and pγs1 = γse
−γs ; Y γs0L and Y
γs
1L (e
γs
1U) are lower (upper) bounds
for Y γs0 and Y
γs
1 , respectively, (e
γs
1 ) is defined in Sec. 3; f(E
γs) is the efficiency of the
error correction protocol; h(x) = −x log2(x)− (1− x) log2(1− x) is the binary Shannon
entropy function. All the parameters used in the simulation are listed in Table 1 and
the associated physical model for the quantum transmission is described in Appendix
E. The calculation of K passes through the estimation of Y γs0L , Y
γs
1L and e
γs
1U, which is
performed by numerical constrained optimisation as explained in Appendix C.
q ed pd ηB ηdet α γw f(E
γs)
1 0.01 5× 10−6 0.5 0.25 0.2 5× 10−4 1.2
Table 1. Experimental parameters used in the simulation of the secure key rate. The
associated physical model is explained in Appendix E. The values reported in the table
are commonly met in a fibre-based QKD setup, see e.g. [65]. The intensity parameters
γs and γv are not displayed in the table as they are optimised numerically at every
distance. The parameter γw is set equal to a constant value to reduce the parameter
space of the simulation. Its effect on the key rate is marginal.
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4.1. Individual THA - Case 1
As mentioned in Sec. 3, Eve’s goal in a THA is to maximise the difference between
the states leaked out of the transmitter. Because these are represented by the coherent
state in Eq. (28), Eve’s task is simpler when the intensity of the relevant states is larger,
as this makes the states more orthogonal. Therefore, the first scenario we consider is
one in which we over-estimate the intensity of the leaked states so to draw a consistent
worst-case scenario for the individual THA. Suppose that the users characterise their
apparatus and find that the intensity of the leaked signals is always upper bounded by
a certain value Imax. This could be the result of an experiment aimed at characterising
the worst-case reflectivity of the transmitter as a whole, without specifically addressing
the individual devices inside the transmitting unit. Because in the estimation of the
secure key rate, Eq. (29), we assume that the parameters θγj are entirely controlled by
Eve, it is conservative to set the intensities of the states leaked out from the transmitter
as follows:
β2γs = β
2
γv = β
2
γw = β
2 = Imax. (30)
The detailed calculation of the trace distance terms Dn,j,k,l for the leaked states under
the settings of Eq. (30) is given in Appendix D.1. Then, the key rate in Eq. (29) is
numerically simulated and the result is plotted in Fig. 2 as a function of the distance
between the users. The colours correspond to different values of the parameter Imax. The
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Figure 2. Secure key rate versus distance in presence of a THA targeting the
modulating devices of a QKD transmitter. Each colour corresponds to a different
value of the intensity of the leaked light, Imax. The depicted key rate is for the worst-
case of a single value of Imax bounding all the intensity settings in the transmitter,
see Eq. (30) in the main text. The solid lines are for a leakage due only to the IM,
while the dashed lines, visible for Imax equal to 10
−6, 10−7 and 10−8, are for the total
leakage coming from IM and PM simultaneously. For every distance, the key rate is
minimised over the angles θγj , controlled by Eve, and maximised over the amplitudes
γs and γv, controlled by Alice. All the parameters used in the simulation are listed in
Table 1.
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black solid line represents the ideal case of no information leakage. When the information
leakage intensity is lower than 10−6 photons/pulse, it is always possible to distill a secure
quantum key, even in presence of the THA. When Imax = 10
−6, the key rate distilled
from our security proof remains positive up to distances of about 30 km. This can
be compared with implementation without decoy states, where a single unmodulated
intensity is used. In this case, the so-called GLLP security proof [60] applies, and the
corresponding key rate is depicted in Fig. 2 as a dashed black line. When Imax is smaller
than 10−12, the key rate in presence of a THA approaches closely that of a perfectly
shielded system over short and medium-range distances, whereas it deviates from ideal
over longer distances. In this latter case, a non-negligible amount of additional privacy
amplification is required to protect the system against the THA. In the same figure,
we also include dashed coloured lines to represent the secure key rate in presence of a
THA that targets simultaneously the IM and the PM enclosed in a QKD transmitter.
For that, we conservatively assumed that Eve gets the same amount of back-reflected
light, Imax, from the IM and the PM separately, so to maximise her information gain
about each modulator. As it is apparent from Fig. 2, the lines corresponding to this
case are almost perfectly overlapping with the lines corresponding to having only the
IM attacked by the THA. This suggests that protecting the IM of a decoy-state QKD
transmitter against the THA is more challenging than protecting the PM alone. In
fact, an optical isolation is required for the IM that is orders of magnitudes larger than
the one for the PM. Even so, this difference is not larger than about 60 dB [42]. This
roughly corresponds to the optical isolation displayed by an inexpensive commercially
available component like a dual-stage optical isolator. Hence this solution is well within
the feasibility range of current technology.
4.2. Individual THA - Case 2
In the previous section, we considered a worst-case assumption for the amount of light
leaked out of the QKD transmitter, Eq. (30). In that model, the leaked intensity was
independent of the inner setting of the transmitter. On the one hand, this permits to
bypass the precise characterisation of the QKD setup. On the other hand, it neglects
a few physical considerations that can considerably improve the key rate. For example,
the fraction of Eve’s light that is back-reflected by a component that precedes the
modulators in the transmitter’s architecture does not contribute to the THA. A second
important consideration is that, according to the initial worst-case scenario drawn for
the individual THA, the modulators are driven with a NRZ logic. This entails that most
of the time during the encoding process the modulators’ medium is non-reflective, as its
refractive index is homogeneous and constant between two consecutive NRZ modulation
values. Hence, the THA has to be executed exploiting not the reflectivity of the IM (or
PM), but that of the interfaces coming after it in the transmitter’s architecture instead.
Specifically, the THA would run as follows]: Eve’s light passes through the IM a first
] We explicitly consider the IM in this description but the argument also applies to the PM.
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time; it hits an interface placed after the IM and is reflected back from it towards the IM;
it passes through the IM a second time and is finally leaked out of the QKD system into
Eve’s hands. During this two-way trip through the IM, Eve’s light undergoes the same
changes as the signals prepared by the transmitter for a normal QKD session. Therefore
the leaked light is now highly informative of the inner settings of the transmitter.
In principle, a two-way round trip through a NRZ-modulated IM entails a double
attenuation of Eve’s light. However, because attenuation plays against Eve in a THA,
it is conservative to assume that Eve’s light is attenuated only once by the IM. To fix
the ideas we can think that it passes unattenuated through the IM on the forward path
and then is attenuated on the backward path in exactly the same way as the legitimate
signals are. In this new scenario, the settings for the amplitudes of the leaked light are:
β2γs = Imax, β
2
γv =
γv
γs
Imax, β
2
γw =
γw
γs
Imax. (31)
Hence, differently from the previous case, Alice’s modulation of the intensity directly
affects now the information leaked to the eavesdropper for any fixed value of Imax.
The detailed calculation of the trace distance terms Dn,j,k,l for the leaked states under
Eq. (31) is given in Appendix D.2.
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Figure 3. Secure key rate versus distance in presence of a THA targeting the
modulating devices of a QKD transmitter. Each colour corresponds to a different
value of Imax. The depicted key rate is obtained when the intensity of the leaked light
is modulated in the same way as for the standard light pulses in decoy-state QKD,
see Eq. (31) in the main text. The solid lines are for a leakage due only to the IM,
while the dashed lines, visible for Imax equal to 10
−6, 10−7 and 10−8, correspond to
the total leakage coming from the IM and the PM of the transmitter simultaneously.
For every distance, the key rate is minimised over the angles θγj , controlled by Eve,
and maximised over the amplitudes γs and γv, controlled by Alice. All the parameters
used in the simulation are listed in Table 1.
In Fig. 3, we plot the secure key rate as a function of the distance between the users,
varying the parameter Imax. The key rate has improved with respect to that in Fig. 2.
For the largest intensity of the leakage in the figure, Imax = 10
−6, the key rate derived
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from our security proof reaches about 60 km distance and is always better than the one
attained with the GLLP approach. Moreover, for a leakage intensity Imax = 10
−12, the
key rate is nearly indistinguishable from the rate of an ideally shielded system (black
solid line in Fig. 3) up to about 100 km, that is 70% of the maximum transmission
distance.
As in the previous case, we include in the figure the simulation of the key rate under
a THA simultaneously run against the IM and the PM (dashed coloured lines in Fig. 3).
Again, the THA against the PM only marginally affects the overall key rate. Therefore
the countermeasure to information leakage based on readily available optical isolators,
discussed in the previous Sec. 4.1, still applies here. Indeed, this solution becomes even
more effective in the realistic scenario described in the present section, due to the better
secure key rate shown in Fig. 3 in comparison with the worst-case key rate presented in
Fig. 2.
4.3. Individual THA - Case 3
In this section, we further improve the key rate under a THA by considering the
phase randomisation of Eve’s signal, as discussed in Sec. 3.1.1. Phase randomisation
can drastically reduce the dangerousness of the THA as it removes any residual
entanglement with the eavesdropper’s probes, and we can expect higher key with the
phase randomisation due to the non-existence of the off-diagonal elements. However,
on the other hand, one has to be very careful about how phase randomisation is
implemented, as this could open new loopholes. For example, if it is realised by adding a
supplementary modulator to the system, Eve could first direct the THA against this new
device to learn the phase information, and then address the PM and the IM as in the
non-phase-randomised case, thus suppressing all the benefits due to the randomisation
of the phase.
However, we showed in the previous sections that the THA against the PM is less
effective than the one against the IM. Therefore, in order to improve the performance
of the system against the THA, it is more important to randomise the phase of Eve’s
light directed against the IM than the one against the PM. This offers an alternative,
possibly more robust, way to implement phase randomisation. Specifically, we can avoid
using an additional ad-hoc module and focus rather on the working mechanism of the
IM, which is part already of the transmitting unit. A common technique to modulate
intensity is via a symmetric Mach-Zehnder interferometer (MZI). The light entering the
MZI is first split into two beams and then recombined with a suitable phase. This
will generate interference and therefore intensity modulation at the output ports of the
MZI. By blocking one of the output ports, intensity modulation is obtained from the
unblocked port as a result of the destructive or constructive interfering process. To
modulate the relative phase between the two arms of the MZI, it is sufficient to control
the refractive index of only one of the two MZI arms, and this is the most commonly
used configuration. However, if a ‘dual-drive’ IM is used instead, both the arms in the
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MZI can be independently controlled, so to gain simultaneous control over the relative
phase as well as the global phase of the signals traversing the IM respect to an external
reference phase. If the global phase in the dual-drive IM is randomised, by encoding in
each time slot a different phase value, Eve’s probing signal will be phase randomised
too and its phase will become uninformative to Eve. In this case, the state of the leaked
signals seen by Eve will not be the one in Eq. (28) any more and will be replaced by
the following one:
ργj = e
−β2γj
∞∑
n=0
β2nγj
n!
|n〉〈n|. (32)
We simulate the secure key rate for this situation using the detailed calculation of the
trace distance terms Dn,j,k,l given in Appendix D.3 and setting the intensities β
2
γj
as
in Eq. (31). That is, we still consider a THA where Eve’s light crosses the IM first
and is back-reflected to Eve from an interface placed after the IM in the transmitter
architecture.
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Figure 4. Secure key rate versus distance in presence of a THA targeting the
modulating devices of a QKD transmitter. Each colour corresponds to a different
value of the leaked intensity Imax. The phase of the leaked light is randomised, see
Eq. (32) in the main text. The solid lines are for a leakage due only to the IM while
the dashed lines, corresponding to a much lower rate, are for the total leakage due to
IM and PM simultaneously. For every distance, the key rate is maximised over the
amplitudes γs and γv. All the parameters used in the simulation are listed in Table 1.
The result of the simulation is reported in Fig. 4. It is apparent that the key rate
has vastly improved with respect to Figs. 2 and 3. Even for a leakage intensity as large as
Imax = 10
−2, the key rate remains positive up to about 40 km. For an intensity smaller
than Imax = 10
−6, the resulting key rate is indistinguishable from the ideal one (solid
black line) over almost the whole distance range. This shows the beneficial effect of
phase randomisation, which was expected from the discussion in Sec. 3.1.1. Differently
from previous cases, the simultaneous information leakage from IM and PM (dashed
lines in the figure) leads now to a key rate that is apparently lower than for a leakage
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due to the IM only (solid lines in the figure). For example, when Imax = 10
−3 and the
leakage is due to the IM only, the key rate remains positive for more than 85 km, while
it falls below 50 km for a simultaneous leakage from PM and IM.
Given the benefit of phase randomisation, a natural question arises if sending
only an n-photon Fock state, rather than its classical mixture, is beneficial to Eve.
In Appendix F, we discuss this point, and we show that the benefit of employing this
attack Eve obtains is negligibly small, i.e., this attack can enlarge the trace distance
only by the order of the transmission rate of Alice’s device, which is negligible given the
proper installation of optical isolators and filters. By recalling that phase randomisation
transforms any state into a classical mixture of Fock states, we can conclude that the
results presented in this section are essentially the secure key rate with the most general
THA against IM assuming the phase randomisation.
From a practical perspective, phase randomisation makes the IM as robust against
information leakage as a non-phase-randomised PM. This, in combination with the
enhanced security due to the removal of any residual entanglement with Eve as well
as that of all the off-diagonal elements, promotes phase randomisation as a relevant
countermeasure to prevent the THA and the information leakage in general from the
transmitter of decoy-state QKD and mdiQKD.
Before concluding this section, it is useful to summarise the physical models and
the assumptions underlying our simulations. This is done with the help of Fig. 5.
In Sec. 4.1, we considered the scenario depicted in Fig. 5(a), leading to Eq. (30). In
this case, the coherent state of light back-reflected by the IM carries in its phase θγj the
information about the intensity settings of the IM, γj. Its amplitude is the maximum
allowed by any physical mechanism used to limit Eve’s input light, irrespective of the
IM settings, thus making the states outputted by Alice more distinguishable to Eve.
This, together with the choice of the angles θγj , chosen to be most favourable to Eve,
let us draw the worst-case key rate lines shown in Fig. 2.
In Sec. 4.2, we devised a more realistic scenario, depicted in Fig. 5(b). Typically,
Eve’s light is reflected by an interface placed after the IM (double line in the figure)
rather than by the IM itself. During the THA, Eve’s light can pass through the IM when
it is fully transmissive, to be reflected by the interface and pass through the IM again
when the intensity settings are on. This way, Eve’s light is modulated with exactly the
same settings γj used by Alice for her own states, leading to Eq. (31) and Fig. 3.
Finally, in Sec. 4.3, we applied phase randomisation to any light emerging from
Alice’s module, as shown in Fig. 5(c). For the intensity of the light back-reflected to
Eve, we considered the same scenario as in Fig. 5(b). The ideal phase randomiser shown
in the figure is a powerful resource as it removes any phase information from the output
states, see Eq. (32), leading to better key rates, as reported in Fig. 4.
The model used to draw the lines for the PM is not explicitly described, as it is
similar to the IM one and is detailed in [42]. Although the cases described in this section
do not constitute an exhaustive list, they represent useful practical cases and can be
used as guidelines for the secure implementation of real QKD systems.
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Figure 5. Models and states used in the simulation of individual THA targeting the
IM. (a) The intensity of the back-reflected light is independent of the intensity settings
(Case 1, Sec. 4.1). (b) The intensity of the back-reflected light depends on the intensity
settings (Case 2, Sec. 4.2). (c) Eve’s back-reflected light is phase randomised and it is
represented by the classical mixture of Fock states (Case 3, Sec. 4.3).
5. Discussion
In this work, we have presented a general formalism to calculate the secret key rate
of decoy-state QKD and mdiQKD under any THA directed against the transmitter’s
modulators. It is useful to give some insight into this formalism, in particular the one
for IM, and discuss why the THA affects the standard theory of decoy states.
In the analysis of the decoy-state method without the THA, a fictitious protocol
is considered where Alice delays her decision on the intensity settings after Bob
detects a pulse. That is, after the detection of the pulse, Alice randomly decides the
intensity setting γs, γv and γw [30]. For simplicity, let us consider the discrimination
between the signal state s and the first decoy state v only. By using the relation
Pr(γis|click, n) + Pr(γiv|click, n) = 1 and the Bayes’s rule, we can rewrite Eq. (4) as:∣∣∣∣ Pr(γv)Pr(γs) + Pr(γv) − Pr(γiv|click, n)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Pr(γs)Pr(γv)Pr(γs) + Pr(γv) Dn,s,vPri(click|n) , (33)
where Dn,s,v := maxiD
i
n,s,v. From this equation, we see that in the case of no THA,
Dn,s,v = 0 and
Pr(γv)
Pr(γs)+Pr(γv)
= Pr(γiv|click, n) for any i and n. This entails that
Alice’s assignment of the intensities in the fictitious protocol can be made identical
and independent of the instance i over the detected instances. This allows us to use
probability inequalities, such as the Multiplicative Chernoff bound [30], which applies
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to independent trials. However, when the THA is on the line, Dn,s,v 6= 0 and the bound
to the L.H.S. of Eq. (33) becomes dependent on the instance i. To solve this problem,
we make use of Azuma’s inequality [56]. Because we are in the asymptotic scenario, the
technical details related to the inequality are unnecessary and we will not write them
here explicitly.
Our formalism does not require any knowledge of Eve’s measurement for the THA
or the detailed specification of the state used. Instead, a detailed characterisation of
the modulators is needed. This is important because while the full characterisation of
Alice’s modulators over many modes is doable at least in principle, the characterisation
of Eve’s THA is impossible even in principle. However, the full characterisation of
Alice’s modulators might be challenging in practice and further research needs to be
done in this direction. We remark that our formalism is a powerful tool in this context
because it can readily accept any mathematical model that describes the behaviour of
the modulators.
As we have discussed in Sec. 3.1.1 and practically demonstrated in Sec. 4.3, it is
important to perform phase randomisation of Eve’s signals to defeat the THA exploiting
entanglement and to enhance the key rate. However, on the other hand, it is important
to perform the randomisation without opening additional loopholes. Also, the question
remains of whether this solution is more practical than the one based on a series of
optical isolators. Active phase randomisation requires precise synchronisation and a
sequence of random numbers in the input. Even if correctly performed, a certain level
of optical isolation is always needed to shield a system from the external environment.
The total amount of required isolation clearly depends on phase randomisation, as seen
by comparing Figs. 3 and 4. However, these figures also show that the difference in the
values of Imax amounts roughly to 60 dB, which can be achieved with a single entirely
passive component like a dual-stage optical isolator. Hence even high isolation levels
can be inexpensively achieved through a series of such isolators.
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have quantified the secure key rate of decoy-state-based QKD in
presence of leaky transmitters. This allowed us to suggest quantitative countermeasures
to restore security even in this more general scenario. A real setup is typically leaky
in practice, due to the presence of side channels hidden in the preparation of the
communication signals, or due to the active intervention of an eavesdropper. The
analysis of this case is then of immediate practical interest. Our analysis applies to
any decoy-state system that uses an intensity modulator or a phase modulator to distill
a quantum key. It includes in fact the most general attack based on the extra information
possibly leaked from such devices.
We have employed our formalism to analyse particular examples of THA, where
Eve exploits coherent states of light to probe the intensity and phase modulators in the
transmitter. Our results show that it is possible to distill a key from leaky transmitters
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that approach the ideal rate of a perfectly shielded system. For that, two main solutions
play a crucial role. On one hand, optical isolation has to be guaranteed for any system
through an adequate number of attenuators and optical isolators. On the other hand,
active phase randomisation can further enhance the protection, removing any residual
entanglement from Eve’s probing signals.
Given the generality of our approach and its applicability to cases of practical
interest, we believe that it will become a fundamental tool to analyse the security of real-
world quantum communication systems, including those for standard QKD, mdiQKD
and the device-independent QKD where phase modulators and/or intensity modulators
are used.
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Appendix A. Azuma’s inequality
In this Appendix we introduce Azuma’s inequality [56]. It can be applied to a
sequence of random variables X(0), X(1), ..., X(l) that satisfies the Martingale and the
Bounded difference conditions (BDC). In particular, a set of random variables is called
a Martingale if and only if E[X(l+1)|X(0), X(1), ..., X(l)] = X(l) holds for any l, where
E[·] represents the expectation value. That is, the expectation value of the (l + 1)th
random variable conditional on all the previous random variables is equal to the lth
random variable. On the other hand, X(0), X(1), ..., X(l) satisfies the BDC if and only if
there exists c(l) > 0 such that |X(l+1) −X(l)| ≤ c(l) for any l. In this scenario, Azuma’s
inequality states that
Pr[
∣∣X(l) −X(0)∣∣ > lδ] ≤ 2e− l2δ22∑lk=1(c(l))2 (A.1)
for any δ ∈ (0, 1).
Now, to derive the result that we use in the main text, we proceed as follows. In
particular, let us consider that we flip coins starting from the first coin in order. The
coins can be correlated in an arbitrary manner. Let yu be the random variable that
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represents the result of the uth coin, with yu = 1 when the result is head and yu = 0
when it is tail. Let P (yu = 1|ξ0, ..., ξu−1) be the conditional probability of having head
in the uth coin conditional on all the results of the previous coins, which we denote as
ξ0, ..., ξu−1. Finally, we denote by Λ(l) the actual number of heads obtained after flipping
l coins. Then, it can be shown that
X(l) := Λ(l) −
l∑
u=1
P (yu = 1|ξ0, ..., ξu−1). (A.2)
is a Martingale and satisfies the BDC. We have, therefore, that
Pr[|Λ(N) −
N∑
u=1
P (yu = 1|ξ0, ..., ξu−1)| > Nδ] ≤ 2e−Nδ
2
2 . (A.3)
Appendix B. Joint THA when the IM and the PM are correlated
In this Appendix, we explain briefly how to adapt our formalism to evaluate as well the
situation where there are arbitrary correlations between the IM and the PM, and Eve
can exploit this fact in her THA.
In this correlated scenario, Alice and Bob could first estimate the bit and basis
dependent single-photon yield, which we denote as Y γs,ξA,ζA1 , for the signal setting. Here,
the parameter ξA denotes Alice’s bit value and ζA is her basis choice. That is, Y
γs,ξA,ζA
1
represents the conditional probability that Bob obtains a “click” event given that Alice
selects the signal setting and sends him a single-photon state encoding a bit value ξA
in the basis ζA. To estimate this yield, Alice can declare Bob (over the authenticated
public channel) all the bit and basis information associated to those instances where she
used a decoy setting and Bob obtained a “click” event. With this information, Alice
and Bob can estimate Y γs,ξA,ζA1 by using a modified version of Eq. (6) given by∣∣Y γj ,ξA,ζAn − [qnklY γk,ξA,ζAn + (1− qnkl)Y γl,ξA,ζAn ]∣∣ ≤ DξA,ζAn,j,k,l . (B.1)
Here, the parameter DξA,ζAn,j,k,l is a modified version of Dn,j,k,l that refers solely to the set
of choices {ξA, ζA}. Note that this modification is needed because now the decoy-state
method is bit-and-basis-dependent. Similarly, one can obtain the single-photon bit error
rate for the signal setting by estimating the yields Y γs,ξA,ζA,ξB,ζB1 . Here, ξB denotes the
bit value obtained by Bob and ζB is his measurement basis choice. That is, Y
γs,ξA,ζA,ξB,ζB
1
is the conditional probability that Bob obtains the bit value ξB conditioned on the fact
that Alice emits a single-photon pulse that encodes the bit value ξA in the ζA basis with
the setting γs and Bob chooses the ζB basis for his measurement. In other words, note
that Y γs,ξA,ζA,ξB,ζB1 also depends on Bob’s basis choice and on his bit value.
After obtaining the single-photon yield as well as the associated error rate, Alice
and Bob generate a secret key from those instances where Alice emitted a single-photon
pulse prepared in the Z basis and using the signal setting, and Bob obtained a “click”
event when he measured the pulse in the Z basis. Note that all the statistics associated to
such instances are estimated through the bit-and-basis-dependent decoy-state method.
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Likewise, one can readily obtain the single-photon yield associated to those events where
Alice emits a single-photon pulse prepared in the X basis and using the signal setting,
and Bob obtains a “click” event when he uses the X basis. Now, to generate a key,
one follows the technique explained in Sec. 3.2 except from a small modification. In
particular, one has to replace Uˆ ζ,iAp,Aa,Ep in Eq. (22) with Uˆ
ζ,i,γs,1
Ap,Aa,Ep
, which is a restricted
version of Uˆ ζ,iAp,Aa,Ep that only considers the single-photon emission part in the signal
setting. That is, Alice and Bob have to characterise the behaviour of the PM depending
on their bases choice when they select the signal setting.
With the modifications above, one can obtain the phase error rate δX−Error|Z from
Eq. (26) because the bit-and-basis-dependent decoy-state method allows us to evaluate
all the parameters needed to solve this equation, all of which are now restricted only to
the single-photon emission events. Then, in the asymptotic limit of a large number of
transmitted signals, we have that the secure key rate is given by
K ≥
1∑
i=0
q{pγs,i,Z0 Y γs,i,Z0L + pγs,i,Z1 Y γs,i,Z1L [1− h(δX−Error|Z)]
− f(Eγs)Qγsh(Eγs)}, (B.2)
where pγs,i,Z0 is the probability that Alice emits the vacuum state given that she chooses
γs and the bit value i in the Z basis. The other parameters which appear in Eq. (B.2)
are defined in a similar manner (see also Eq. (29)). Therefore, we conclude that one
can apply our formalism to analyse also the case where there are arbitrary correlations
between the IM and the PM, and prove security in the most general case, given that a
full description of the behaviour of these two devices is available.
Appendix C. Estimation of Y γs0L , Y
γs
1L and e
γs
1U
In this Appendix we show that these parameters can be estimated using linear
programming. Such instances of optimisation problems can be solved efficiently in
polynomial time [66]. Although the estimation method presented here is valid for any
number of decoy states used by Alice, we will assume, like in the main text, that Alice
employs three different intensity settings: γs, γv and γw.
Our starting point is Eq. (6). Let us consider first the case k = l. As shown
in Appendix D, the parameters Dn,j,k do not depend on the photon number n, at least
for the examples considered in Sec. 4. This means, in particular, that this equation can
be rewritten as
|Y γjn − Y γkn | ≤ Dj,k, (C.1)
or, equivalently, the yields Y
γj
n and Y γkn satisfy
Y γjn = Y
γk
n + ∆
jk, (C.2)
with ∆jk ∈ [−Dj,k, Dj,k]. Since Alice uses three different intensity settings, we have the
following six conditions
Y γsn = Y
γv
n + ∆
sv, Y γsn = Y
γw
n + ∆
sw,
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Y γvn = Y
γs
n + ∆
vs, Y γvn = Y
γw
n + ∆
vw,
Y γwn = Y
γs
n + ∆
ws, Y γwn = Y
γv
n + ∆
wv. (C.3)
By combining the first and the third one, we find, for example, that ∆sv = −∆vs.
Similarly, we obtain ∆sw = −∆ws and ∆vs − ∆ws = ∆vw = −∆wv. By using this last
condition we find, therefore, that
Y γvn = Y
γs
n + ∆
vs = Y γsn + ∆
ws + ∆vw,
Y γwn = Y
γs
n + ∆
ws. (C.4)
That is, we can express the yields Y γvn and Y
γw
n as a function of Y
γs
n and the parameters
∆ws and ∆vw.
Next, we consider the case k 6= l. In this scenario, Eq. (6) can be rewritten as
Y γjn = qnklY
γk
n + (1− qnkl)Y γln + ∆njkl, (C.5)
for all n, where ∆njkl ∈ [−Dn,j,k,l, Dn,j,k,l]. We have, therefore, the following three
conditions:
Y γsn = qnvwY
γv
n + (1− qnvw)Y γwn + ∆nsvw,
Y γvn = qnswY
γs
n + (1− qnsw)Y γwn + ∆nvsw,
Y γwn = qnsvY
γs
n + (1− qnsv)Y γvn + ∆nwsv. (C.6)
If we substitute in these equations the value of Y γvn and Y
γw
n given by Eq. (C.4) we
obtain the following three equality constraints:
0 = ∆ws + qnvw∆
vw + ∆nsvw,
0 = qnsw∆
ws + ∆vw −∆nvsw,
0 = qnsv∆
ws − (1− qnsv)∆vw −∆nwsv. (C.7)
Finally, by taking into account that ∆njkl ∈ [−Dn,j,k,l, Dn,j,k,l] for all n and for all
j, k, l ∈ {s, v,w} with j 6= k 6= l, we have that to satisfy Eq. (C.7) we must fulfill the
following conditions:
−Dn,s,v,w ≤ ∆ws + qnvw∆vw ≤ Dn,s,v,w,
−Dn,v,s,w ≤ qnsw∆ws + ∆vw ≤ Dn,v,s,w,
−Dn,w,s,v ≤ qnsv∆ws − (1− qnsv)∆vw ≤ Dn,w,s,v. (C.8)
Appendix C.1. Estimation of Y γs0L
Here we present a linear program to estimate the parameter Y γs0L . We will assume that
all the quantities below refer to events where both Alice and Bob use the same basis
(e.g., the Z basis), which will be considered as the key generation basis. We start by
calculating the gain associated to the different intensity settings selected by Alice in this
scenario. If we combine Eqs. (2) and (C.4) we have that
Qγs =
∞∑
n=0
pγsn Y
γs
n ,
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Qγv =
∞∑
n=0
pγvn (Y
γs
n + ∆
ws + ∆vw) =
∞∑
n=0
pγvn Y
γs
n + ∆
ws + ∆vw,
Qγw =
∞∑
n=0
pγwn (Y
γs
n + ∆
ws) =
∞∑
n=0
pγwn Y
γs
n + ∆
ws. (C.9)
That is, all the gains can be written as a function of the yields Y γsn together with the
additional terms ∆ws and ∆vw.
Eq. (C.9) contains an infinite number of unknown parameters Y γsn . Next, we reduce
it to a finite set. For this, we derive a lower and upper bound for the gains Qγ that only
depend on a finite number, Scut + 1, of yields Y
γs
n . In particular, since 0 ≤ Y γsn ≤ 1 and
pγsn ≥ 0 for all n, we have that
Qγs ≥
Scut∑
n=0
pγsn Y
γs
n ,
Qγs ≤
Scut∑
n=0
pγsn Y
γs
n +
∞∑
n=Scut+1
pγsn =
Scut∑
n=0
pγsn Y
γs
n + Γ
γs , (C.10)
for any Scut ≥ 0. Here the parameter Γγs is defined as Γγs =
∑∞
n=Scut+1
pγsn = 1−
∑Scut
n=0 p
γs
n .
By using a similar procedure, one can obtain as well a lower and upper bound for Qγv
and Qγw .
Based on the foregoing, we find that Y γs0L can be calculated using the following linear
program:
min Y γs0
s.t. Qγs ≥
Scut∑
n=0
pγsn Y
γs
n ,
Qγs − Γγs ≤
Scut∑
n=0
pγsn Y
γs
n ,
Qγv ≥
Scut∑
n=0
pγvn Y
γs
n + ∆
ws + ∆vw,
Qγv − Γγv ≤
Scut∑
n=0
pγvn Y
γs
n + ∆
ws + ∆vw,
Qγw ≥
Scut∑
n=0
pγwn Y
γs
n + ∆
ws,
Qγw − Γγw ≤
Scut∑
n=0
pγwn Y
γs
n + ∆
ws,
0 ≤ Y γsn ≤ 1, ∀n ≤ Scut,
−Dw,s ≤ ∆ws ≤ Dw,s, −Dv,w ≤ ∆vw ≤ Dv,w,
−Dn,s,v,w ≤ ∆ws + qnvw∆vw ≤ Dn,s,v,w, ∀n ≤ Scut,
−Dn,v,s,w ≤ qnsw∆ws + ∆vw ≤ Dn,v,s,w, ∀n ≤ Scut,
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−Dn,w,s,v ≤ qnsv∆ws − (1− qnsv)∆vw ≤ Dn,w,s,v, ∀n ≤ Scut (C.11)
Note that the value of the parameters Dj,k and Dn,j,k,l, with j, k, l ∈ {s, v,w}, is provided
in Appendix D. Also, the value of the observables Qγj for a typical channel model can
be found in Appendix E. The linear program above has Scut + 3 unknown parameters:
Y γsn , ∆
ws and ∆vw. Its solution is directly Y γs0L .
Appendix C.2. Estimation of Y γs1L
To calculate Y γs1L , we can reuse the linear program given by Eq. (C.11), only substituting
its linear objective function with Y γs1 .
Appendix C.3. Estimation of eγs1U
To obtain eγs1U, we can again reuse the linear program given by Eq. (C.11), only making
the following three changes. First, all the parameters now refer to the X basis rather
than the Z basis. For example, Qγj now denotes the gain when Alice selects the intensity
setting γj and both Alice and Bob use the X basis, and similarly for the other quantities
that appear in Eq. (C.11). Second, we substitute the parameters Qγj with QγjEγj
for all j ∈ {s, v,w}, and we replace the yields Y γsn with other variables that we will
denote as ωγsn . These variables represent the value of Y
γs
n e
γs
n . Third, we substitute the
linear objective function with −ωγs1 , where the minus sign is because Eq. (C.11) is a
minimisation problem and we are interested in obtaining an upper bound for ωγs1 .
If we denote the solution to this optimisation problem as nsol, then e
γs
1U is simply
given by
eγs1U = −
nsol
Y γs1L
, (C.12)
where, again, Y γs1L now denotes a lower bound on the yield of the single-photon pulses
when both Alice and Bob employ the X basis. The value of the observables Qγj and
Eγj for a typical channel model is provided in Appendix E.
Appendix D. Estimation of Dn,j,k and Dn,j,k,l
In this Appendix we calculate the parameters Dn,j,k and Dn,j,k,l for the three examples
studied in Sec. 4. These parameters are needed to estimate a lower bound on the yields
Y γs0 and Y
γs
1 , together with an upper bound on the phase error rate e
γs
1 , which is done
in Appendix C.
All these examples correspond to individual THA, which implies that the states
ρn,γij , which are accessible to Eve, do not depend on the instance i. In addition, they
assume, as expected in most practical situations, that there is no correlation between
Alice’s system Ap and Eve’s system E
′
p. That is, ρn,γij = Pˆ (|n〉) ⊗ ργj . This means, in
particular, that
Dn,j,k = d
(
ργj , ργk
)
,
Dn,j,k,l = d
(
ργj , qnklργk + (1− qnkl)ργl
)
, (D.1)
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for all n. In this scenario, the parameters Dn,j,k do not depend on the photon number
n and we will denote them as Dj,k. Next, we calculate these quantities for the different
cases.
Appendix D.1. Individual THA - Case 1:
In this example, the states ργj are of the form ργj = Pˆ (|βeiθγj 〉). We have, therefore,
that
Dj,k =
√
1− |〈βeiθγj |βeiθγk 〉|2 =
√
1− e2β2[cos (θγk−θγj )−1]. (D.2)
Here we can assume, without loss of generality, that θγs = 0. Moreover, we will denote
β2 := Imax. This implies, in particular, that Dw,s and Dv,w are given by
Dw,s =
√
1− e2Imax[cos (θγw )−1],
Dv,w =
√
1− e2Imax[cos (θγw−θγv )−1]. (D.3)
The parameters Dn,j,k,l have the form
Dn,j,k,l =
1
2
∣∣∣Pˆ (|βeiθγj 〉)− qnklPˆ (|βeiθγk 〉)− (1− qnkl)Pˆ (|βeiθγl 〉)∣∣∣ . (D.4)
In order to calculate these quantities we use the following Claim, which requires to
obtain the eigenvalues of a 3× 3 matrix.
Claim. Let {|αi〉}i={1,2,3}, be three normalised but not necessarily orthogonal vectors,
and let λi be the eigenvalues of a 3× 3 matrix A defined as
(A)i,j = δi,1〈α1|αj〉 − pδi,2〈α2|αj〉 − (1− p)δi,3〈α3|αj〉, (D.5)
with 1 ≥ p ≥ 0 and where δi,j is the Kronecker delta. Then
1
2
∣∣∣Pˆ (|α1〉)− pPˆ (|α2〉)− (1− p)Pˆ (|α3〉)∣∣∣ = 1
2
∑
i
|λi| (D.6)
Proof. To calculate the trace distance of ρ := Pˆ (|α1〉) − pPˆ (|α2〉) − (1 − p)Pˆ (|α3〉) we
need to determine its eigenvalues. Moreover, from the properties of the determinant we
have that Det(ρ−λ1ˆ) = Det(V −1ρV −λ1ˆ) for any invertible linear operation V . Then,
we can construct V as follows
V |i〉 = |αi〉, and 〈i|V −1 = 〈α¯i|, (D.7)
where {|i〉}i={1,2,3} is an orthonormal basis, and |α¯i〉 represent unnormalised vectors
satisfying 〈α¯i|αj〉 = δi,j. With these definitions, we can use V and |α¯i〉 to relate the
matrix elements of V −1ρV defined in the orthogonal basis {|i〉}i to those of ρ defined in
the nonorthogonal basis {|αi〉}i. In particular, we have that
〈i|V −1ρV |j〉 = 〈α¯i|ρ|αj〉 = 〈α¯i|Pˆ (|α1〉)|αj〉 − p〈α¯i|Pˆ (|α2〉)|αj〉
− (1− p)〈α¯i|Pˆ (|α3〉)|αj〉 = (A)i,j, (D.8)
with (A)i,j given by Eq. (D.5).
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Appendix D.2. Individual THA - Case 2:
In this example, the states ργj are of the form ργj = Pˆ (|βγjeiθγj 〉), where the amplitudes
βγj are given in Eq. (31). That is, here we assume that the back-reflected light that
goes to Eve is attenuated in a similar manner as Alice’s signals. In this scenario, we
have that
Dj,k =
√
1− |〈βγjeiθγj |βγkeiθγk 〉|2
=
√
1− e−β2γj−β2γk+2βγjβγk cos (θγk−θγj ). (D.9)
Again, if we assume, without loss of generality, that θγs = 0 and we use Eq. (31) we find
that the quantities Dw,s and Dv,w are given by
Dw,s =
√
1− e− Imaxγs [γs+γw−2
√
γsγw cos (θγw )],
Dv,w =
√
1− e− Imaxγs [γv+γw−2
√
γvγw cos (θγw−θγv )]. (D.10)
The parameters Dn,j,k,l have the form
Dn,j,k,l =
1
2
∣∣∣Pˆ (|βγjeiθγj 〉)− qnklPˆ (|βγkeiθγk 〉)− (1− qnkl)Pˆ (|βγleiθγl 〉)∣∣∣ .
(D.11)
Like in the previous subsection, we calculate these quantities by using the Claim
introduced above.
Appendix D.3. Individual THA - Case 3:
Here the states ργj are of the form given by Eq. (32) with the intensities β
2
γj
given by
Eq. (31). This corresponds to the scenario where Eve’s back-reflected light is phase-
randomised and, moreover, it is attenuated in a similar manner as Alice’s signals. In
this situation, we have that
Dj,k =
1
2
∞∑
n=0
∣∣∣∣∣e−β2γj β2nγjn! − e−β2γk β2nγkn!
∣∣∣∣∣ . (D.12)
This means, in particular, that the parameters Dw,s and Dv,w are given by
Dw,s =
e−Imax
2
∞∑
n=0
Inmax
n!
∣∣∣∣1− eImax(1−γw/γs)(γwγs
)n∣∣∣∣ ,
Dv,w =
1
2
e−
Imaxγv
γs
∞∑
n=0
(Imaxγv/γs)
n
n!
∣∣∣∣1− eImaxγv/γs(1−γw/γv)(γwγv
)n∣∣∣∣ . (D.13)
These expressions involve an infinite number of terms. However, one can easily upper
bound them with a finite sum. For instance, it can be shown that when Imax ≤ log 2
and γs ≥ γv ≥ γw (which is always satisfied in the simulation results shown in Sec. 4)
Dw,s and Dv,w can be upper bounded as
Dw,s ≤ 1
2
− e
−Imax
2
Pcut∑
n=0
Inmax
n!
[
1−
∣∣∣∣1− eImax(1−γw/γs)(γwγs
)n∣∣∣∣] ,
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Dv,w ≤ 1
2
− 1
2
e−
Imaxγv
γs
Pcut∑
n=0
(Imaxγv/γs)
n
n!
×
[
1−
∣∣∣∣1− eImaxγv/γs(1−γw/γv)(γwγv
)n∣∣∣∣] . (D.14)
for any Pcut ≥ 1. To see this, let us consider, for instance, the parameter Dw,s. From
Eq. (D.13) we have that Dw,s satisfies
Dw,s =
e−Imax
2
Pcut∑
n=0
Inmax
n!
∣∣∣∣1− eImax(1−γw/γs)(γwγs
)n∣∣∣∣+ e−Imax2
∞∑
n=Pcut+1
Inmax
n!
,
×
∣∣∣∣1− eImax(1−γw/γs)(γwγs
)n∣∣∣∣ ≤ e−Imax2
Pcut∑
n=0
Inmax
n!
×
∣∣∣∣1− eImax(1−γw/γs)(γwγs
)n∣∣∣∣+ e−Imax2
∞∑
n=Pcut+1
Inmax
n!
. (D.15)
In the inequality condition we have used the fact that∣∣∣∣1− eImax(1−γw/γs)(γwγs
)n∣∣∣∣ ≤ 1 (D.16)
for all n ≥ 0 and Imax ≤ log 2 given that γs ≥ γv ≥ γw. This is so because eImax ≥
eImax(1−γw/γs)
(
γw
γs
)n
≥ 0. Finally, by substituting the term e−Imax/2∑∞n=Pcut+1 Inmax/n!
with 1/2[1 − e−Imax∑Pcutn=0 Inmax/n!] we obtain Eq. (D.13). The derivation of the upper
bound for Dv,w is analogous.
The parameters Dn,j,k,l are given by
Dn,j,k,l =
1
2
∞∑
n=0
∣∣∣∣∣e−β2γj β2nγjn! − qnkle−β2γk β2nγkn! − (1− qnkl)e−β2γl β2nγln!
∣∣∣∣∣ . (D.17)
If we substitute the intensities β2γj with the values given in Eq. (31) we have, therefore,
that
Dn,s,v,w =
1
2
∞∑
n=0
e−Imax
Inmax
n!
∣∣∣∣1− qnvweImax(1−γv/γs)(γvγs
)n
− (1− qnvw)eImax(1−γw/γs)
(
γw
γs
)n ∣∣∣∣,
Dn,v,s,w =
1
2
∞∑
n=0
e−Imax
Inmax
n!
∣∣∣∣eImax(1−γv/γs)(γvγs
)n
− qnsw
− (1− qnsw)eImax(1−γw/γs)
(
γw
γs
)n ∣∣∣∣,
Dn,w,s,v =
1
2
∞∑
n=0
e−Imax
Inmax
n!
∣∣∣∣eImax(1−γw/γs)(γwγs
)n
− qnsv
− (1− qnsv)eImax(1−γv/γs)
(
γv
γs
)n ∣∣∣∣. (D.18)
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Again, these equations involve an infinite number of terms. However, as above, it can
be shown that when Imax ≤ log 2 and γs ≥ γv ≥ γw the parameters Dn,s,v,w, Dn,v,s,w and
Dn,w,s,v are upper bounded by
Dn,s,v,w ≤ 1
2
{
1−
Pcut∑
n=0
e−Imax
Inmax
n!
(
1−
∣∣∣∣1− qnvweImax(1−γv/γs)
×
(
γv
γs
)n
− (1− qnvw)eImax(1−γw/γs)
(
γw
γs
)n ∣∣∣∣)},
Dn,v,s,w ≤ 1
2
{
qnsw + (1− qnsw)eImax −
Pcut∑
n=0
e−Imax
Inmax
n!
(
qnsw + (1− qnsw)
× eImax −
∣∣∣∣eImax(1−γv/γs)(γvγs
)n
− qnsw − (1− qnsw)eImax(1−γw/γs)
×
(
γw
γs
)n ∣∣∣∣)},
Dn,w,s,v ≤ 1
2
{
qnsv + (1− qnsv)eImax −
Pcut∑
n=0
e−Imax
Inmax
n!
(
qnsv + (1− qnsv)
× eImax −
∣∣∣∣eImax(1−γw/γs)(γwγs
)n
− qnsv − (1− qnsv)eImax(1−γv/γs)
×
(
γv
γs
)n ∣∣∣∣)}, (D.19)
for any Pcut ≥ 1. To see this, the procedure is analogous to the one used to derive
Eq. (D.14). In particular, let us consider the quantity Dn,s,v,w. From Eq. (D.18) we
have that Dn,s,v,w can be upper bounded as
Dn,s,v,w ≤ 1
2
Pcut∑
n=0
e−Imax
Inmax
n!
∣∣∣∣1− qnvweImax(1−γv/γs)(γvγs
)n
− (1− qnvw)eImax(1−γw/γs)
(
γw
γs
)n ∣∣∣∣+ 12
∞∑
n=Pcut+1
e−Imax
Inmax
n!
. (D.20)
Here we have used the fact that∣∣∣∣1− qnvweImax(1−γv/γs)(γvγs
)n
− (1− qnvw)eImax(1−γw/γs)
(
γw
γs
)n ∣∣∣∣
≤ 1, (D.21)
for all n ≥ 0 and Imax ≤ log 2 given that γs ≥ γv ≥ γw. Eq. (D.21) holds because
eImax ≥ eImax(1−γk/γs)(γk/γs)n ≥ 0 for all k ∈ {v,w}. Finally, by replacing in Eq. (D.20)
e−Imax/2
∑∞
n=Pcut+1
Inmax/n! with 1/2[1 −
∑Pcut
n=0 e
−ImaxInmax/n!] one obtains Eq. (D.19).
The upper bounds for Dn,v,s,w and Dn,w,s,v can be obtained in a similar manner.
Appendix E. Toolbox for Alice and Bob, and channel model
In this Appendix we introduce a simple mathematical model to characterise Alice’s and
Bob’s devices, together with the behaviour of a typical quantum channel. This model is
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used to simulate the observed experimental data Qγj and Eγj , with j ∈ {s, v,w}, which
is needed to evaluate the examples considered in Sec. 4. Here we will consider that Qγj
and Eγj do not depend on the basis setting, i.e., they are equal for both the Z and the
X basis.
In particular, we assume the standard decoy-state BB84 protocol with phase-
encoding. In each time slot, Alice prepares two WCP, the signal and the reference
pulse, whose joint phase is perfectly randomised. Then, she selects at random a phase
modulation φ ∈ {0, pi/2, pi, 3pi/2} and applies it to the signal pulse. The values 0 and
pi (pi/2 and 3pi/2) correspond to the Z (X) basis. In addition, Alice uses an intensity
modulator to randomly choose the intensity γ ∈ {γs, γv, γw} of both the signal and the
reference pulse following the prescriptions of the decoy-state method. As a result, Alice
sends Bob states of the form
|Ψφ,γ〉Ap =
1
2pi
∫ 2pi
0
Pˆ
(
|
√
γieiθ〉r|
√
γiei(θ+φ)〉s
)
dθ, (E.1)
where the subscript s (r) identifies the signal (reference) pulse and θ ∈ [0, 2pi) is a
random phase.
On the receiving side, Bob uses a Mach-Zehnder interferometer to divide the
incoming pulses into two possible paths. Then he applies a phase shift φ ∈ {0, pi/2}
together with a one-pulse delay to one of them, and he recombines both pulses at
a 50 : 50 beamsplitter. This beamsplitter has on its ends two single-photon detectors,
which we denote as D0 and D1. Whenever the relative phase between the two interfering
pulses is 0 (±pi) only the detector D0 (D1) can produce a “click”, which indicates that
at least one photon has been detected. In case that both detectors “click” Bob uses the
standard post-processing step where he assigns a random value to the raw bit [67]. Given
that both detectors have the same quantum efficiency and assuming for the moment that
there is no side-channel in Bob’s measurement unit, this data post-processing guarantees
the so-called basis independent detection efficiency condition. That is, Bob’s detection
efficiency is the same for both BB84 bases. Each detector is described by a positive
operator value measure with two elements, Fˆnoclick and Fˆclick. The outcome of Fˆnoclick
corresponds to a “no click” event, whereas the operator Fˆclick gives one detection “click”.
These operators are given by
Fˆnoclick = (1− pd)
∞∑
n=0
(1− ηdet)nPˆ (|n〉),
Fˆclick = 1ˆ− Fˆnoclick. (E.2)
Here pd denotes the detector’s dark count rate and ηdet is its detection efficiency.
The quantum channel introduces loss that can be parametrised by the transmission
efficiency ηchannel given by
ηchannel = 10
−αd
10 , (E.3)
where α is the loss coefficient of the channel measured in dB/km and d is the transmission
distance measured in km. In addition, we assume that the QKD setup has an intrinsic
error rate ed due to misalignment and instability of the optical system.
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By using the mathematical models above, it can be shown that the gain Qγj and
the error rate Eγj can be expressed as
Qγj = 1− (1− pd)2e−γjηsys .
Eγj =
1
2
+
1
2Qγj
(1− pd)
[
e−γjηsys(1−ed) − e−γjηsysed] , (E.4)
where ηsys represents the overall loss of the system. It is given by
ηsys = ηchannelηBηdet, (E.5)
with ηB being the internal loss of Bob’s measurement device without considering his
detectors. That is, we assume that the total loss within Bob’s receiver is ηBηdet.
Appendix F. Approaching the optimal THA with phase-randomised
coherent states
In this Appendix we consider the scenario where Eve’s back-reflected light is phase-
randomised (i.e., case 3 in Sec. 4), and we analyse an alternative strategy for Eve. More
precisely, we assume that Eve sends Alice n-photon Fock states instead of coherent
states. This constitutes her optimal strategy in this situation, and below we analyse
how much could now the parameters Dj,k deviate from the ones obtained in Appendix
D.
Let us consider here the standard model of a beamsplitter with transmissivity ηγj
to characterise the loss introduced by Alice’s device on Eve’s input signals. Then, if Eve
injects an n-photon state |n〉 into Alice’s device, the state of the back-reflected light is
given by
σγj =
∞∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
ηkγj(1− ηγj)n−k|k〉〈k|, (F.1)
The trace distance between these states and the ones given by Eq. (32) is
d(ργj , σγj) :=
1
2
∞∑
k=0
∣∣∣Pηγjµ(k)−Bηγj (n, k)∣∣∣ , (F.2)
where Pηγjµ(k) := e
−ηγjµ(ηγjµ)
k/k! is a Poisson distribution of mean ηγjµ, Bηγj (n, k) :=(
n
k
)
ηkγj(1− ηγj)n−k is a Binomial distribution, and ηγj denotes Alice’s transmission rate.
When compared to the notation used in Eq. (32), note that β2γj := ηγjµ, with µ being
the intensity of Eve’s input pulses. Importantly, from [68] we have that whenever µ = n
(i.e., the intensity of Eve’s input pulses is the same in both scenarios) then Eq. (F.2)
can be upper bounded by
d(ργj , σγj) ≤ 2ηγj . (F.3)
Then, by using the triangle inequality we have that the trace distance between σγj
and σγk is upper bounded by
d(σγj , σγk) =
1
2
∞∑
k=0
∣∣∣Bηγj (n, k)−Bηγk (n, k)∣∣∣ ≤ 2(ηγj + ηγk) +Dj,k, (F.4)
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where Dj,k = d(ργj , ργk) is given by Eq. (D.12).
In the examples considered in Sec. 4 the parameters ηγj are typically very small
(of the order of 10−13 − 10−18 for a 1 GHz-clocked QKD system) for all j ∈ {s, v,w}.
This means, in particular, that d(σγj , σγk) ≈ Dj,k and, therefore, the results presented
in Sec. 4 (see case 3) are also valid for the scenario where Eve injects n-photon Fock
states into Alice’s device.
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